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Discrimination against certain social groups over long time periods has
been a historical feature of many societies. For instance, in the US dis-
crimination in the form of slavery officially ended in 1865 after more than
∗ Ramachandran: Department of Microeconomics and Management, Goethe Univer-
sity Frankfurt, Germany. (email: ramachandran@econ.uni-frankfurt.de). Rauh: Depart-
ment of Economics, University of Cambridge, UK. (email: cr542@cam.ac.uk).
We would like to thank Miguel-Angel Ballester, Steven Durlauf, Tore Ellingsen, Joan
Esteban, Itzhak Gilboa, Jim Heckman, Aviad Heifetz, Hannes Mueller, Jan Stuhler, Jack
Willis, and participants of the seminar at Toulouse School of Economics, the SSSI 2012
at the Becker Friedman Institute of University of Chicago, the 2012 Asia Meeting of the
Econometric Society, New Delhi, and the 2013 annual meeting of the Royal Economic
Society, London, for their valuable feedback. All errors are ours.
1
2two centuries, though racial segregation was maintained in the form of Jim
Crow laws until 1965.1 Starting with the civil rights movements in the
early 1960’s, one has seen significant advances in the rights and outcomes of
the black population. However, today the black population still lag behind
whites in a range of socio-economic characteristics. In India, caste, which
is inherited by birth, was a marker for social discrimination for centuries.
At independence in 1947, the practice of untouchability was made illegal
and affirmative action was enshrined in the constitution for disadvantaged
groups. However, the lower castes continue to trail significantly behind other
social groups in terms of most socio-economic indicators. What contributes
to the gap between groups that faced discrimination over long time periods
and those that did not? In what outcomes and why might we observe per-
sistent gaps? Could discrimination persist due to more subtle channels than
the traditionally assumed channels of taste based discrimination, statistical
discrimination, and discriminatory social norms?
In this paper, we posit a channel of discrimination, where even under per-
fect observability of individual ability, the absence of discriminatory social
norms, and when taste for discrimination has already died out, to discrimi-
nate can be the optimal response. The theoretical mechanism put forth rests
on the existence of beliefs about discrimination by others in society, and on
distinguishing between activities characterized by the need for interlinkages
versus no need for interlinkages. In our model, activities with interlinkages
require coordinated actions. If an individual decides to establish interlink-
ages, she requires the input of two principals to form a productive unit. The
1Note that slavery had existed in colonial America since the 17th century but the
United States as an independent nation state came into existence in 1774 and slavery
ended 91 years later.
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success and return for all, the individual and the two principals, is contin-
gent on the participation of all three in the venture. The coordination failure
results from the belief that somebody else might discriminate and refuse to
participate in the venture, which imposes losses due to the complementarity
of inputs in the production process.
The classic example would be the case of entrepreneurs who need to es-
tablish multiple interlinkages (productive relations) to be able to start and
operate a venture (Basu, 2010). In the theoretical model, individuals choose
between entering activities which require establishing productive relations
and those that do not. Individuals intending to enter activities involving
interlinkages are randomly matched with a pair of “principals”, for instance
a lender and a distributor, with whom they need to establish interlinkages
to form a productive unit. The individual cannot produce without capital
and cannot sell without a distributor. In case one of the principals agrees
to participate and the other does not, the investment of the first principal
is held up and imposes a fixed cost. We show how in the presence of beliefs
about discrimination against a certain group, principals without a taste for
discrimination in equilibrium also discriminate against that group.
To clarify the theoretical mechanism, picture the following situation: Both
the lender and the distributor have no preference for discrimination against
the individual and know she has the requisite ability to be an entrepreneur.
However, the lender does not know whether the distributor is a discriminator
because historically principals had been discriminating against individuals of
her type. The lender has a belief about the presence of taste discriminators,
which he has been updating through Bayes rule based on past observations.
If the lender believes with a sufficiently high probability that the distribu-
4tor has a preference for discrimination, he will reject the loan application.
Now, if alternatively the distributor had signed the contract to distribute the
goods but the individual has not obtained a loan to produce, the distributor
loses out, because by setting up the productive relation he has foregone the
chance for an alternative investment. Therefore, in the future the distributor
will account for the possibility of the individual being matched with a taste
discriminator. The individual also faces a cost because she invested time
and effort to become self-employed but did not manage to do so. Conse-
quently, people from her type might also refrain from attempting to become
self-employed. This leads us to a persistent equilibrium in which able people
are not becoming self-employed due to past discrimination and the resulting
coordination failure based on beliefs, leaving everybody worse off.2
Under certain conditions, the model predicts lower participation rates and
higher cost of establishing interlinkages for the discriminated group relative
to the non-discriminated group in equilibrium, leading to an overall welfare
loss for society.3 The model also establishes conditions under which the
steady-state equilibrium is characterized by the existence of discrimination
due to beliefs about the existence of taste discriminators, although there are
no taste discriminators left in society. The persistence of beliefs regarding
discrimination in the steady state are rationalized by presenting evidence
that these can be interpreted as intergenerational transmission of beliefs in
the sense of collective memories, consistent with utility maximizing or cul-
tural trait preserving strategies.
The theoretical framework identifies occupational choice, such as self-
2The example of the distributor believing the lender will discriminate is analog and
would exhibit the same outcome.
3Later we show that this result is robust to allowing for communication between the
two principals as long as there are no reputation effects.
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employment, as markets characterized by interlinkages, making it a suit-
able candidate for empirical scrutiny. We examine the market for self-
employment of blacks and whites in the United States. Using data from the
General Social Survey (GSS) from the years 1972-2012 (Smith et al., 2012),
we create proxies of beliefs about and tastes for discrimination against blacks
for every region and year. We provide evidence that our constructed mea-
sures of taste for discrimination are a reasonable proxy for the actual trend
of taste for discrimination, despite relying on self-reported preferences.
The time trends of taste for discrimination and beliefs about discrimi-
nation from the GSS and the self-employment rates for blacks and whites
from the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the time period 1972-2012
are shown in Figure 1.4 Taste for discrimination against blacks linearly de-
clines over the period, whereas beliefs about discrimination against blacks
as well as the gap between the self-employment rates for blacks and whites
remain remarkably constant over the same time period. Figure 1 captures
the mechanism and the role of sticky or unchanging beliefs highlighted by
the theoretical model in a snapshot. The unchanging beliefs perfectly cor-
respond to the invariant gap in self-employment rates over the period ana-
lyzed, as predicted by the theoretical framework. Using a logit model, we
find our proxy for beliefs about presence of discrimination to be a signifi-
cant and negative correlate of the probability of becoming self-employed for
blacks in the US. The results are robust to the inclusion of a race dummy
to account for other unobservable characteristics of racial groups, as well
as year and region fixed effects. The presented statistical associations are
persistent across a variety of specifications and present suggestive evidence
4See Section II.A for how the measures of taste and beliefs about discrimination are
constructed.
6in favor of the theoretical framework, though no causal claims can be made
on the basis of the available data.
The literature of the economics of discrimination was pioneered by the
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
Sh
ar
e 
of
 p
op
ul
at
io
n
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Beliefs about discrimination Taste1 for discrimination
Taste2 for discrimination White self−employed
Black self−employed
Datasource: General Social Survey, IPUMS CPS
Figure 1. : Self-employment rates by race and beliefs and taste regarding
discrimination in the US
seminal work of Becker (1957). In the setting envisaged, employers hold
a taste for discrimination, such that working with members of a particu-
lar group imposes a cost on them, and hence these workers have to com-
pensate the employer by either being more productive or accepting lower
wages. The class of models of statistical discrimination (Phelps 1972; Ar-
row 1973; Aigner and Cain 1977; Lundberg and Startz 1983, 1998; Coate
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and Loury 1993; Rose´n 1997) and categorical thinking (Fryer and Jackson
2008) rely on the imperfect observability of worker productivity. In absence
of complete information employers base their decision on easily observable
characteristics, such as race or gender, to infer the expected productivity
of the worker. Mailath, Samuelson and Shaked (2000) present a model of
endogenous discrimination arising from the search decision of firms. The
asymmetric discriminatory equilibrium is supported due to the belief that
there are more skilled available workers of a particular type, which is borne
out in equilibrium. The third class of models is that of Akerlof (1976, 1985)
and Peski and Szentes (2013), where not following the established norm of
discrimination against certain groups might result in imposition of social
sanctions which cause economic losses, and hence make discrimination a
rational response. Our model provides a new mechanism as to how discrim-
ination can persist. In our setting the distribution of ability within the two
groups is identical ex-ante and ex-post, there is perfect observability of abil-
ity, and there are no social norms to discriminate. Moreover, the nature of
the coordination failure highlighted does not allow for a single principal who
does not discriminate to reap the unrealized profits, a possibility tradition-
ally assumed by Becker (1957), therefore providing a theoretical rational as
to why discrimination can persist. To our knowledge, we are also the first
to provide empirical evidence, albeit correlational, concerning the channel
of discrimination presented theoretically.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section I presents the static
and dynamic theoretical model, Section II presents empirical support of
our theory and extends applications to other markets and situations, and
Section III concludes.
8I. The model
The society consists of individuals i of two types si ∈ {A,B}. The types
A and B form social groups based on visible characteristics which do not
influence performance (e.g., race, gender). Individuals of type A and B
belong to the finite, large sets A and B, respectively.5 Individuals have an
ability ai, where a is distributed uniformly over [0, 1]. Ability ai ∈ [0, 1]
reflects productive capacity and is perfectly observable to all. For sake of
simplicity we are dropping the index i in what follows.
Those referred to throughout the paper as “individuals” can opt to engage
in one of the two possible kinds of productive activities in the economy
(L ∈ {0, 1}) - activities that involve establishing interlinkages (L = 1) with
other agents, who are referred to as “principals” P ∈ {p1, p2}, and activities
that do not establish interlinkages (L = 0). In case the individual i of
type s decides to engage in an activity that does not involve establishing
interlinkages with other principals in the economy, she earns a net income
on her activity equal to the level of her productivity, which is given by:
(1) W = GNL(a) = a,
where GNL is the production function of activities not involving interlink-
ages. On the other hand, individuals have the option of engaging in an
activity which involves establishing interlinkages with other principals, and
earn a gross income equal to:
(2) W = GL(a, C) = λcp1cp2a,
5The assumption of large sets is to ensure that any single individual does not have
any market power and collusion cannot take place.
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where GL is the production function for activities involving interlinkages.
The above production function GL captures the notion of interlinkages. Ac-
tivities requiring interlinkages imply that the gross income from this activity
not only depends upon the individual’s own ability a, but also on C. The
component C = (cp1 , cp2) captures the interlinkages or productive relations
individual i is able to establish with the principals in the economy. Inter-
linkages refer to the fact that the production in such activities is a joint
process and requires input from multiple sources.
We denote by cP ∈ {0, 1} the decisions by the principal P ∈ {p1, p2}
of whether to establish productive relations. Thus, we only allow for pure
strategies, such that the two principals decide whether to establish the re-
lation (cP = 1) or not (cP = 0). Moreover, it is assumed that in case the
principals decide to establish a productive relationship with the individual,
they need to make an investment, which is normalized to unity. The incen-
tive for engaging in activities that involve establishing interlinkages arises
as complementary investment by the principals results in a boost to produc-
tivity, captured by the factor λ(> 1) in the production function GL.
A simple example to fix ideas for activities that are characterized by the
need to establish interlinkages, is the market for self-employment.6 For ex-
ample, an entrepreneur might require capital in the form of a loan from
a bank (lender) to produce goods and also may need to have an agree-
ment with a distributor willing to distribute her goods. The example with
the requirement of productive relations with two principals, a distributor
and a lender, is only for illustrative purposes and tractability, and could
be extended to n-players or include any other contact necessary to setup a
6In Section II.D we outline a range of alternative applications of the model beyond
self-employment.
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successful enterprise (e.g., supplier, landlord to rent office).
The functional form in (2) exhibits an extreme form of complementarity
in the actions of the principals P , implying GL(a, C) = GL(a, (cp1 , 0)) =
GL(a, (0, cp2)) = 0. The intuition is that establishing a relationship with
both principals P ∈ {p1, p2} is required for the individual to produce, as
neither component (loan, distribution route) can be substituted through
ability.
A. The static game
Individuals i decide whether they want to enter an activity that involves
no interlinkages, or whether to enter into activities involving interlinkages
by trying to establish productive relations with the principals. As already
noted, individuals who decide to enter activities involving no linkages earn
a net income equal to their ability a.
Individuals wanting to enter activities involving interlinkages are randomly
matched with a pair of principals, p1 and p2, in the market to try to estab-
lish productive relations. Principals have an outside opportunity of a risk
free investment yielding interest r per unit invested. To establish a produc-
tive relationship, and in return for the investment in their activity by the
principals, the individual’s offer an amount σP to each of the principals as
repayment for the investment. In case this offer is rejected by any one of
the principals, the attempt to enter the activity with interlinkages fails and
the individual i faces a fixed cost δ from the effort exerted. She then enters
the activity not involving interlinkages and earns a net income of (a− δ).
The offer, denoted by σP , made by the individual to the principal arises
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as a solution of a Nash bargaining process over the surplus generated from
the activity involving interlinkages compared to the alternative involving no
interlinkages. The bargaining takes place between each principal and the
individual separately, without communication between p1 and p2.
7 In light
of the production function given by (2), the outcome is dependent on what
decision the other principal (henceforth denoted by −P ) makes. Hence, P
has a belief concerning the likelihood of the other principal accepting the
offer as well.8 If P accepts an offer which the other principal rejects, then
he is not able to obtain r from the risk free investment in the given period
due to his capital being bound and not yielding any interest.
The production function given by (2) implies that production can take
place only if the grand coalition, i.e. of the two principals and the indi-
vidual, forms. This implies returns to bilateral agreements are zero and
hence in the absence of a grand coalition, the individual prefers to enter
the activity involving no interlinkages and the principals prefer investing
in the risk-free asset. Thus, the disagreement points are exogenously given
by their outside option and, contrary to Bennett (1997) and Burguet and
Caminal (2011), do not depend on what the individual can achieve in the
alternative negotiation. The interaction between the individual and the
principal is characterized by a monopoly versus monopsony, commonly re-
ferred to as bilateral monopoly. Both have one shot at earning a surplus
compared to their outside option. Assuming equal bargaining power and
linear utility functions in payoffs, the bargaining solution, resulting in offer
7Communication could be allowed between the two principals and would not change
our results if we assume costly communication or no reputation effects. Without reputa-
tion effects moral hazard problems would arise as there would be no gain from admitting
when one was not willing to establish the productive relation.
8We disregard higher order beliefs (as in, the lender believes that the distributor
believes that etc.), even though they would additionally speed up the contagion-effect.
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σP , is characterized by the disagreement point given by the outside option,
i.e. d = (di, dP ) = (a− δ, 1 + r), and the maximization of:
(3) (σP−1−r)(λa−σP−σ−P−a+δ)⇒ σP = (λ− 1)a− σ−P + r + δ + 1
2
.
Now assuming i makes the same offer to the two principals, such that σP =
σ−P , the Nash bargaining solution is defined as:
(4) σN(a) =
(λ− 1)a+ r + δ + 1
3
.
This Nash bargaining solution is a function of a, which we denote as σN(a).
In order for P to accept this offer, we require the amount he expects to be
repaid to be at least what he can earn through the risk free investment, i.e.
(1 + r).
Let the state variables x = (a, s) be given by ability a and type s of an
individual i. The utility of the individual is Vi(x), which will either be given
by the utility of not establishing interlinkages V NLi (x), or by the expected
utility of attempting to establish interlinkages EC [V
L
i (C, x)]. Formally, the
static game for the individual can be written as
(5)
Vi(x) = max
L∈{0,1},σ∈R+
{V NLi (x), EC [V Li (C, x)]}
subject toEC [V
L
i (C, x)] = C(λa− 2σ) + (1− C)(a− δ) if L = 1
V NLi (x) = a if L = 0,
C = cp1cp2 , σ ≥ σN(a).
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As noted before, the offer σ made by the individual to the principals arises
from a process of Nash bargaining, and is the minimum offer that will be
accepted by a principal given our assumption of equal bargaining power.
However, in the optimization problem of the individual, given by (5), we
allow the individual to offer an amount greater than the Nash bargaining
solution in case it maximizes her utility. In other words, if an offer of σN(a)
is acceptable to the principal, so is any offer σ ≥ σN(a), as it gives the
principal a share of the surplus more than commensurate to his bargaining
power.
For the principal, the static game concerning his decision cP ∈ {0, 1} is
represented by
(6)
VP (x, σ) = max
cP∈{0,1}
{V c0P , Ec−P [V c1P (c−P , x, σ)]}
subject toEc−P [V
c1
P (c−P , x, σ)] = c−Pσ + (1− c−P ) if cP = 1
V c0P = 1 + r if cP = 0.
Given σN(a) from (4) it is now possible to calculate the lowest ability
individual, denoted by a′, who could possibly offer the principal a share
dominating the risk free investment, and is given by:
(7) σN(a) =
(λ− 1)a+ r + δ + 1
3
≥ 1 + r ⇒ a′ = 2(1 + r)− δ
λ− 1 .
Now looking at the participation constraint of the individual, we require
λa− 2σN(a) ≥ a
(8) ⇒ a∗ = 2(1 + r + δ)
λ− 1 .
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Since a∗ > a′ only individuals with a ≥ a∗ will intend to enter activities
involving interlinkages and, as long as there is no taste for or belief about
discrimination, will be accepted.9
B. Discrimination in the static framework
The static game outlines the decision making process and identifies the
lowest ability type a∗ from both groups s ∈ (A,B) who enter into activities
involving interlinkages without discrimination.
Now assume that individuals and principals believe that there exist prin-
cipals with a taste for discrimination.10 Taste for discrimination can be
understood as a cost/disutility which principals with taste for discrimina-
tion face when they decide to establish a productive relation with a B-type
individual in society, and is captured by the parameter b(> 0).
The belief regarding the presence of taste discriminators implies that the
probability of discrimination occurring has to be taken into account while
deciding on the optimal course of action. Due to the random matching, the
assigned probability of meeting a principal with a taste for discrimination
is equal to what is believed to be the share of total taste discriminators
among principals. As the share is not observable, decisions are conditioned
on beliefs shared by the principals and individuals about the fraction of
discriminators amongst principals, which is assumed to be equal to ϕ. The
extensive game form is exhibited in Figure 2.
From the static model without discrimination, we know that the min-
imum offer that will be accepted by a principal without a taste for dis-
9Similar to Lucas Jr (1978), in our model only the most able want to enter the activity
involving interlinkages such as entrepreneurship.
10How this belief can arise and sustain itself even after all principals with taste for
discrimination have died out is discussed in the next subsections.
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Figure 2. : Extensive game form of decision of B-type individual
crimination is σN(a) ≥ (1 + r), i.e. a return greater than the risk free
investment. Similarly, observe that any offer σN(a) ≥ (1 + r + b) will be
always accepted, even by principals with a taste for discrimination, as it
compensates for the taste for discrimination. This implies that only offers
in the range (1 + r) ≤ σN(a) < (1 + r + b) could be subject to any discrimi-
nation. Individuals and principals are expected payoff maximizers. In light
of the above, discrimination is defined in the following manner:
DEFINITION 1: An offer of σN(a) > 1 + r, which is rejected by any prin-
cipal, is defined as a case of discrimination.
Individuals of the B-type now take the probability of meeting a discrimi-
nator in the market into account while deciding on their optimal course of
action.
DEFINITION 2: Let us denote by a∗b the lowest ability type such that σ
N(a∗b) =
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1 + r + b and by ab the ability of an individual who is indifferent between
offering (1 + r + b) to each principal and entering an activity not involving
interlinkages.
All individuals with ability a ≥ a∗b offer σN(a) ≥ 1 + r + b and will never
be discriminated against. Individuals in the ability range a∗ ≤ a < a∗b
potentially face discrimination. These individuals compare the expected
payoff from each of the three actions available to them, given by:
E[Vi(x)] =

(1− ϕ)2(λa− 2σN(a)) + (1− (1− ϕ)2)(a− δ) if (L = 1, σ = σN(a))
λa− 2(1 + r + b) if (L = 1, σ = 1 + r + b)
a if L = 0.
The expected payoff from applying for the activity involving interlinkages
(L = 1) and offering the Nash bargaining solution depends on the belief
ϕ about the share of taste discriminators. The payoffs from offering each
principal (1 + r + b) and escaping potential discrimination, as well as from
entering the activity involving no interlinkages, are certain. Individuals
choose whichever profile (L, σ) maximizes their expected payoff.11
Principals with no taste for discrimination, when facing an individual of
the B-type in the ability range a∗ ≤ a < a∗b that offers σN(a), compare their
expected payoff from accepting the offer to the certain payoff from the risk
free investment:
E[VP (x)] =
(1− ϕ)σ
N(a) + ϕ if cP = 1
1 + r if cP = 0,
11Recall that an individual is always free to offer a σ ≥ σN (a) in case that maximizes
his/her expected utility.
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and choose the option that gives them the greater expected payoff. Here we
can observe how discrimination has spilled over to those principals without a
taste for discrimination, as they now take into account the probability of the
individual being matched with a principal who is a taste discriminator.12 In
case the principal P accepts and the counterpart −P rejects the individual’s
offer, the principal P will lose his risk free return r. Thus, the principal P ,
due to the belief that the individual might face discrimination from principal
−P , also ends up discriminating against the individual of type-B. Principals
with a taste for discrimination equal to b reject the Nash bargaining solution
when facing an individual in the ability range a∗ ≤ a < a∗b and accept offers
from a ≥ a∗b .
Observe that taste for discrimination against B-type individuals does not
affect the A-types in the market. The A-types play the identical game as in
the static framework without discrimination. All individuals of the A-type
with a ≥ a∗ still offer σN(a) and are accepted.
For the B-types potentially exposed to discrimination, observe that
(9) λa− 2σN(a) > (1− ϕ)2(λa− 2σN(a)) + (1− (1− ϕ)2)(a− δ),
such that the expected payoff without discrimination, ceteris paribus, will
always be greater for the individual. Recall from (8), the individual with
the lowest ability, who applies to enter activities with interlinkages in the
absence of beliefs about discrimination, is given by a∗, which implies:
(10) λa∗−2σN(a∗) = a∗ > (1−ϕ)2(λa∗−2σN(a∗))+(1−(1−ϕ)2)(a∗−δ).
12In the Online Appendix, when discussing policy interventions, we show that discrim-
ination under certain interventions can even spillover to the A-type as well
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Expression (10), combined with the fact that the payoff from offering the
Nash bargaining solution is strictly increasing in a, implies some value of
a > a∗, denoted by adb, will solve the equation such that (1 − ϕ)2(λadb −
2σN(adb)) + (1− (1− ϕ)2)(adb − δ) = adb.
DEFINITION 3: Ability adb is the minimum ability of a B-type wanting to
apply for interlinkages offering the Nash bargaining solution in the presence
of beliefs about discrimination.
In the equilibrium of the static game with beliefs about discrimination, all
A-types with a ≥ a∗ apply to enter activities involving interlinkages, of-
fer the Nash bargaining solution, and are successful. For the B-types, if
adb < ab, only individuals with a ≥ adb > a∗ apply to enter activities involv-
ing interlinkages offering the Nash bargaining solution, and are successful.13
On the other hand, if adb > ab, individuals with a ≥ ab > a∗ apply to en-
ter activities involving interlinkages and are successful. B-type individuals
with a > adb offer the Nash bargaining solution, like their A-type counter-
parts. However, B-type individuals in the ability range ab ≤ a < adb offer
(1 + r + b) > σN(a), an offer strictly greater than the ones offered by the
A-types in the same ability range.
Beliefs about discrimination, hence, have two potential effects: (i) if
adb < ab, individuals of type B in the range a
∗ ≤ a < adb, enter activi-
ties involving no interlinkages, whereas A-types of the same ability enter
activities involving interlinkages and enjoy the associated surplus, and (ii) if
adb > ab, individuals of B-type in the range a
∗ ≤ a < ab enter activities in-
volving no interlinkages, whereas A-types of the same ability enter activities
13Recall ab is defined as the ability type from group B who is indifferent between
offering (1 + r+ b) to each principal and entering an activity not involving interlinkages.
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involving interlinkages and enjoy the associated surplus. On the other hand,
B-types in the range ab ≤ a < adb enter activities involving interlinkages,
but pay a higher price to the principals than the A-types in the equivalent
ability range.
C. The dynamic game and the belief updating process
In the previous subsection, we assumed that there was an exogenously
given belief regarding the probability of meeting a taste discriminator in
society. In light of this assumption, we characterized the optimal decisions
in a static framework. The logical questions that arise are whether these
beliefs are consistent with a model of rational decision makers in a dynamic
setting in which beliefs are updated, and how these beliefs regarding taste
for discrimination can persist when there are no taste discriminators left in
society.
In order to address these questions, we now extend the framework and
allow for the game to be repeated every period. Assume that the taste for
discrimination arises due to a shock to the taste of a subset of principals in
society at time t0. It is assumed that pi0 proportion of principals develop
a taste for discrimination equal to b(> 0) against establishing a productive
relation with B-type individuals.14 The origins of the shock which result in
creating a taste for discrimination among a subset of principals is not the
focus of the paper. An example could be the incidents of September 11th
2001, which resulted in discriminatory actions against Muslims in the US
14Allowing principals to have different tastes for discrimination leaves our results es-
sentially unchanged. The case for two different levels of taste for discrimination, bh (high)
and bl (low) is provided in the Online Appendix.
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(e.g., Kaushal, Kaestner and Reimers 2007).15
In the dynamic game we assume time to be discrete and indexed by t.
A principal P exits the market with exogenous probability ω every period.
The probability ω is not known to anybody in society. A principal without
a taste for discrimination replaces the exiting principal, such that at some
point no principals with a taste for discrimination will be left. Therefore,
if we define the share of principals with a taste for discrimination in period
t = 0 to be pi0, the share of principals pit with taste for discrimination in
period t is pi0(1− ω)t.
Since neither pit nor ω are common knowledge, decisions are conditioned
on beliefs about the share of discriminators amongst principals, which are
updated through observations of discrimination in the market.16 We as-
sume that the event which creates a taste for discrimination initially results
in creating a common prior among individuals and principals.17 The com-
mon prior is assumed to have a distribution denoted by η0, capturing the
probability of meeting a principal with a taste for discrimination. The com-
mon prior η0 is modeled as having a beta distribution. More specifically, it is
assumed that individuals and principals believe that the share of principals
with taste b has a beta distribution with parameters α0 and β0. Moreover,
we denote the density of the distribution η0 by θ. The beta distribution
captures the belief regarding the probability of meeting a principal with
15The assumption that shocks do not work the other way, i.e. people immediately
forget the past existence of discrimination due to sudden events today, is justified by
the literature on trust and beliefs which shows how persistent past beliefs are in shaping
todays action. See section I.E for discussion and references.
16The definition of a case of discrimination is provided in Definition 1.
17The importance of the initial prior is negligible as we envisage a setting with long
term discrimination, thereby reducing the weight the initial prior has in long run beliefs.
In an earlier version of the paper beliefs were updated following frequentist approach as
in case-based decision theory by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995).
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a taste for discrimination through its expected value, or the mean of the
distribution.
ASSUMPTION 1: The probability parameter capturing the share of lenders
with a taste for discrimination equal to b in period t0 is given by θ(η0) ∼
beta(α0, β0).
The above distribution implies that the density function associated with
facing a discriminator with taste b is given by:
(11) θ(η0) =
(η0)
α0−1(1− η0)β0−1
beta(α0, β0)
=
(α0 + β0 − 1)!
(α0 − 1)!(β0 − 1)!(η0)
α0−1(1− η0)β0−1
The beta distribution gives us a density on [0, 1], which captures the be-
liefs held by individuals and principals regarding η0. As individuals and
principals need to decide on optimal actions based on their beliefs, and
all individuals and principals are assumed to be risk neutral, individuals
and principals use the expected value of the distribution which is given by
E(η0) =
α0
α0+β0
.18
The belief updating process of principals and individuals is characterized
by a standard Bayesian approach. Assume that in period 1, n1 individuals
of the B-type applied and k1 cases of discrimination were observed in the
market. Out of the total of n1 cases, assume that n1b(≤ n1) cases involve
offers σ ≥ σN(a), such that (1 + r) ≤ σ < (1 + r+ b). This implies the total
number of people who could potentially be discriminated against is n1b.
ASSUMPTION 2: It is assumed that all market transactions in terms of
the offers made and rejected are common knowledge.19
18This is the point at which the density of the distribution takes its highest value.
19We relax this assumption in the Online Appendix to allow individuals and principals
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Given that out of the potential n1b cases, k1 cases exhibit discrimination,
we can define the posterior density function for the individuals and prin-
cipals in society. The posterior function for θ(η0) is given by θ(η1|k1) ∼
beta(α0 + k1, β0 + n1b − k1).
The above outlines the Bayesian belief updating procedure used by in-
dividuals and principals regarding the probability of meeting a principal
with taste for discrimination. We can denote the posterior distribution
for any period T > t0, given the total number of B-type individuals who
make offers σN(a), such that (1 + r) ≤ σN(a) < (1 + r + b), in order
to become entrepreneurs, and the cases of discrimination observed in the
market. The posterior probability density is given by θ(ηT |
∑T
t=1 kt) ∼
beta(α0 +
∑T
t=1 kt, β0 +
∑T
t=1 ntb −
∑T
t=1 kt). The associated expected value
or the point probability estimate used by individuals and principals to make
their optimal decision is given by:
(12) E(ηT ) =
α0 +
∑T
t=1 kt
α0 + β0 +
∑T
t=1 ntb
.
DEFINITION 4: Let ϕt = E(ηt−1), such that ϕt is the probability that
individuals and principals assign to the existence of a principal with taste
for discrimination b in period t.
The decision-making rules of individuals and principals imply that the prob-
ability of entering an activity involving interlinkages for a B-type individual
in any period T will depend upon her ability a, the actual share of taste
discriminators pi0(1 − ω)T , and the beliefs ϕT regarding the share of taste
to observe only a subset of all the market transactions and show that the results remain
essentially unchanged.
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discriminators in society. We can thus express the probability of entering an
activity involving interlinkages for a B-type individual as a function of the
above three factors, i.e. f(a, pi0(1−ω)T , ϕT ). It is easy to see that the prob-
ability of entering an activity involving interlinkages is increasing in ability
and declining in the actual share and the belief regarding the proportion of
taste discriminators in society, i.e. f1 > 0, f2 < 0, and f3 < 0, where the
subscripts refer to the first, second, and third argument of the function. In
Section II we explicitly test for the predictions of our model using the above
function f .
D. Characterization of the dynamic steady state equilibrium under no
remaining taste for discrimination
The channel of discrimination that we put forth works on the premise
that even once all principals with taste for discrimination have died out, to
discriminate against members of group B may remain as the optimal action.
In what follows we address whether discrimination can exist, and if it can,
under what conditions does it exist, for how long does it persists, and in what
form does it manifest itself. Let us denote by T ∗ the first period in which
no principals with taste for discrimination remain in the economy. The
probability density function, given the beliefs and the Bayesian updating
rule used, for meeting a principal with a taste for discrimination is given by:
(13) beta(α0 +
T ∗−1∑
t=1
kt, β0 +
T ∗−1∑
t=1
ntb −
T ∗−1∑
t=1
kt).
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The probability point estimate for meeting a discriminator is given by
(14) ϕT ∗ =
α0 +
∑T ∗−1
t=1 kt
α0 + β0 +
∑T ∗−1
t=1 ntb
.
It is clear that all B−type individuals with a ≥ a∗b will offer their Nash
bargaining solution and be accepted.20 The form of discrimination and the
length for which it will persist after all principals with taste for discrimina-
tion have died out will depend on ϕT ∗ , i.e. the belief on the probability of
the individual meeting a taste discriminator.
The point probability estimates in period T ∗ are a function of the initial
beliefs (α0, β0), the actual share of taste discriminators pi0, and the rate ω
at which principals with a taste for discrimination exit the market in every
period. If we assume that the initial beliefs are a function of the actual
share of taste discriminators, i.e. α0(pi0) and β0(pi0), then we can write
ϕT ∗ = z(pi0, ω). In the proposition that follows, we highlight the various
forms in which discrimination manifests itself and persists in the multiple
steady state equilibria depending on ϕT ∗ after no principals with a taste for
discrimination are left.
PROPOSITION 1: 1) Let ϕT ∗ be such that no individual of the type B
in the range a∗ ≤ a < a∗b prefers the Nash bargaining solution to wage
employment at time T ∗. In such a scenario discrimination based on
beliefs persists forever. Discrimination manifest itself in two forms:
(i) B-types being underrepresented, relative to A-types, in activities
involving interlinkages at the lower tail of the ability distribution and
(ii) B-types, in the middle ability ranges, pay a strictly higher fee to
20Recall σN (a∗b) = 1 + r + b and σ
N (a) is increasing in a.
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establish interlinkages than the A-types with similar ability.
2) Let ϕT ∗ be such that some individual of B-type with ability in the range
a∗ ≤ a ≤ a∗b strictly prefers the Nash bargaining solution to obtaining
wage employment. This implies that in the long run discrimination
will not persist. However, B-types are penalized in the form of lower
participation rates relative to A-types for a finite duration before beliefs
about discrimination disappear from society.
Proof in the Appendix.
The equilibrium outcome in which discrimination persists forever crucially
depends on who is the lowest B-type deciding to apply for the activity involv-
ing interlinkages when the last principal with taste for discrimination dies
out. This occurs when all individuals of the B-type, whose Nash bargaining
solution is not sufficiently high to compensate the taste for discrimination,
i.e. a < a∗b , decide to enter activities involving no interlinkages rather than
seek to establish productive relations. Even if an offer which could be sub-
ject to potential discrimination were to be made, it would be rejected due
to beliefs about discrimination being prohibitively high. Therefore, this
equilibrium is even stable under the trembling hand. This in turn implies
that beliefs remain frozen at the current level and hence all individuals with
ability levels a∗ ≤ a < ab will always prefer entering activities involving no
interlinkages.
However, if when the last principal with taste for discrimination dies out,
the lowest B-type who decides to enter an activity involving interlinkages is
one whose Nash bargaining solution is not sufficient to compensate the taste
for discrimination, i.e. a < a∗b , implies discrimination will not persist in the
long run. Now that all principals with taste for discrimination have died out
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and beliefs are not prohibitively high, all offers made by individuals seeking
to establish productive relations will be accepted. As this includes individ-
uals whose offers could have been subject to potential discrimination, but
are not (as no taste discriminators are left), the next period beliefs about
discrimination will be lower after beliefs have been updated. As every pe-
riod all offers are accepted, in the long run the belief about discrimination
will converge to zero.
E. Persistence of beliefs as collective memories
The model presented above assumes that once the equilibrium set of beliefs
have been established they can persist over time under certain conditions.
The crucial question then arises as to how and why beliefs regarding the
presence of discrimination might tend to persist? We interpret transmission
of beliefs in our model as happening through intergenerational transmission
of collective memory regarding discrimination.
The contemporary usage of the term collective memory can be traced
back to Emile Durkheim (1859-1917), and his student Maurice Halbwachs
(1877-1945), who published the seminal study titled The social framework
of memory in 1925. The concept of memory has been constructed in the
literature as to how the mind works in a society and how their operations are
structured by social arrangements. Halbwachs argues: “It is in society that
individuals normally acquire their memories. It is also in society that they
may recall, recognize and localize their memories” (Halbwachs 1992, 38).
Formulation of memories regarding the past are hence affected by transmis-
sion of cultural beliefs and norms in society.
Beliefs regarding discrimination can be seen to fulfill the two important cri-
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teria to be categorized as collective memories. First, events which influence
collective memory are widely documented and recorded in these societies
(Griffin and Bollen 2009). For the case of discrimination against blacks in
the US or Dalits in India, these events have been widely recorded and rec-
ollected. Second, a consensual view of the recollected past. The presence
of affirmative action policies in the US and India serve as clear signals of
consensus among policymakers and the public at large concerning the need
to address previous wrongs.
Beliefs regarding discrimination being transmitted as collective memory
through generations can also be rationalized by economic models of cul-
tural transmission such as in Bisin and Verdier (2001) and Dess´ı (2008).
They show that transmission of existing beliefs by parents to their offspring
would be consistent with maximizing the utility of children or preserving
their cultural traits. Finally, the importance of history, culture, and past
events such as discrimination in shaping today’s beliefs, behavior, and out-
comes, has also been demonstrated in the empirical literature (Nunn and
Wantchekon 2011; Voigtla¨nder and Voth 2012; Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn
2013) and brought forth theoretically in Argenziano and Gilboa (2012).
The above discussion highlights the fact that beliefs regarding discrimina-
tion could be understood as collective memories that are passed on from one
generation to another, which can be remarkably similar for long stretches of
time.
F. Welfare effects
Now, let us consider the loss of welfare to society when discrimination
persists due to beliefs, despite no taste for discrimination remaining in the
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economy. The efficiency loss not only affects the B-type individuals, who be-
come involved in activities involving no interlinkages instead of establishing
productive relations (which would be the social optimum), but also the prin-
cipals, who lose out on opportunities of receiving offers yielding more than
the risk free investment r. Assuming that the necessary and sufficient condi-
tion of proposition 1.1 hold and discrimination persists, we can quantify the
deadweight loss of each period to the B-type as
∑ab
a≥a∗ [(λa− 2σN(a))− a],
while the deadweight loss to principals is
∑ab
a≥a∗ 2[σ
N(a)−(1+r)]. Addition-
ally, a wealth transfer takes place, as B-types offering (1 + r + b) to escape
discrimination are paying a higher price than the equivalent A-type, from
which principals are profiting as they are receiving more than the Nash
bargaining solution.21 The transfer from the B-types to the principals is∑a∗b
a≥ab 2[(1 + r + b)− σN(a)].
PROPOSITION 2: In an equilibrium as in proposition 1.1, on average both
principals earn lower profits by discriminating.
Proof in the Appendix.
In the top panel of Figure A1 in the Appendix the difference between net
earnings of the A and the B-type in function of their ability is illustrated.
The dark shaded area is the deadweight loss caused by individuals of the
B-type not entering activities involving interlinkages due to beliefs about
discrimination, whereas the light shaded area illustrates the transfer caused
by the higher price individuals of the B-type are paying in order to escape
discrimination when choosing activities involving interlinkages.
21This theoretical prediction is consistent with the finding of the US Department of
Justice that Countrywide charged more than 200,000 black and Hispanic borrowers higher
fees and interest rates than comparable whites with similar credit histories between 2004
and 2008 leading to the Bank of America paying a settlement of 335M$.
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In the GSS dataset the pattern of average income in constant dollars of
the self-employed by highest educational degree attained, exhibits a striking
similarity with our theoretical prediction. As can be seen in bottom right
panel of Figure A1 in the Appendix, on average blacks earn less than whites
in self-employment for all but those that obtained a graduate degree, which
is the highest degree coded in the dataset.
II. Data and empirics
As foreshadowed in our discussion in the theoretical section, we empiri-
cally investigate the market for self-employment in the US, an occupation
characterized by the need to establish interlinkages across markets. We an-
alyze whether the patterns of self-employment of blacks, as compared to the
white population, are correlated to differences in taste for and belief about
discrimination across regions and time in the US.
The empirical literature dealing with discrimination and self-employment
in the US documents the differences in participation and returns between
ethnic groups (Moore 1983; Borjas 1986; Bailey and Waldinger 1991; Fairlie
1999; Fairlie and Meyer (1996, 2000); Blanchflower, Levine and Zimmerman
2003; Fairlie and Robb 2008; Blanchflower 2009). In line with our theoreti-
cal predictions the above mentioned studies find that black males have lower
self-employment rates, blacks are more likely to have loan applications re-
jected, and pay higher interest rates on loans than comparable white males
do. For the case of wage employment, premarket skills measured by the
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score have been shown to account
for most of the black-white wage gap (Neal and Johnson 1996). However, for
the case of self-employment, Fairlie (2002) shows that controlling for AFQT
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test scores does not significantly reduce the black-white gap concerning self-
employment rates, suggesting that discrimination might have a role to play
in explaining the observed differences in self-employment rates.
A. Data
We use the General Social Survey (GSS) from 1972-2012 along 29 ques-
tionnaires to provide empirical support for the predictions of our theoretical
framework. The data allows us to construct proxies for the belief about and
taste for discrimination parameters in our model. We construct two proxies
of taste for discrimination by computing the share of whites by year and
region that express taste for discrimination. We define taste discriminators
to be:
1) Whites answering “yes” to “Do you think there should be laws against
marriages of Blacks and Whites?”
2) Whites who are “very” or “somewhat opposed” when asked “What
about having a close relative marry a Black person?”
In order to construct a proxy for beliefs regarding discrimination, we take
the share of the sample, for each year and region, answering the following
question with “yes”:
• “On the average Blacks/African-Americans have worse jobs, income,
and housing than White people. Do you think these differences are
mainly due to discrimination?”
Unfortunately, neither of these questions is asked throughout all survey
years, which, depending on the specification, restricts our sample size to be-
tween 14,719 and 23,895 observations. In Figure 1 the two measures of taste
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for discrimination, beliefs about discrimination, and the self-employment
rates of blacks and whites are plotted from 1972-2012 for those years where
the corresponding questions were included in the surveys. The discrimina-
tion measures are from the GSS dataset, whereas for expositional purposes
self-employment rates by race are obtained from the Current Population
Survey (CPS) March supplement provided by the Integrated Public Use
Microdata Series (King et al. 2010).
Tastes for discrimination seem to decline linearly. Beliefs about discrim-
ination, on the other hand, have remained remarkably stable, just as the
gap in self-employment rates between blacks and whites. Not decomposing
by region, beliefs about discrimination among whites peak in 1985 at 45%
and reach its lowest point in 2004 at 34%. Our first measure for taste for
discrimination among whites declines from 39% in 1972 to 10% in 2002. The
second measure declines from 66% in 1990 to 21% in 2012.22
The usage of survey responses is susceptible to the problem that responses
to delicate questions, such as those concerning discrimination, can be sub-
ject to a social desirability bias. A respondent might claim not to have
discriminatory taste due to social desirability, which might not reflect real
preferences. In order to validate that we are capturing a real trend in dis-
criminatory taste, in Figure 3 we plot our second measure of taste for dis-
crimination at the aggregate level against a range of racially-motivated hate
crimes committed in the US against blacks (namely the number of total
victims, murder and manslaughter, forced rape, aggravated assault, simple
assault, and intimidation).23 The hate-crime statistics are obtained from the
22In the Online Appendix we decompose the time trends of belief about discrimination
by region.
23We do not plot the first measure for taste for discrimination because it only overlaps
with the available hate crime statistics for only four years. However, the correlations are
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Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Uniform Crime Reports for the years
1996-2012.24 The proxy for taste for discrimination aggregated at the na-
tional level (grey dashed line) follows a downward trend closely resembling
the downward trend for all racially-motivated hate crimes against blacks
with correlations ranging between 0.76 for forced rape to 0.91 for murder
and manslaughter. Racially-motivated hate crimes could be seen as ex-
treme expressions of discriminatory taste, wherefore the exhibited patterns
strengthen the validity of our taste for discrimination measure. 25
B. The method
Following the theoretical model we derive the equation for the estimation
of the probability of individuals being self-employed as a function of ability
a, the proportion pitqs of principals with a taste for discrimination at time
t in region q against group s, the proportion ϕtqs with beliefs about dis-
crimination at time t in region q against group s, and a vector of individual
characteristics Xi with associated parameter vector γ. As a proxy for ability
we use years of schooling. Therefore, the probability of individual i at time
t in region q and of group s being self-employed seitqs ∈ {0, 1} we define as
(15) Prob(seitqs = 1|a, ϕtqs, pitqs, Xi) = f(a, ϕtqs, pitqs, Xi).
similarly high and available upon request.
24For FBI hate-crime statistics against blacks see Table 7 of the reports to be found
at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime.
25However, this downtrend could simply reflect an overall downward trend in criminal
activity. In order to reject this hypothesis, we normalize the occurrence of racially-
motivated hate crimes by the total frequency of arrests of white individuals for murder
and manslaughter as well as aggravated assault. Unfortunately, we do not have data on
arrests for all of the before mentioned crimes. As can be seen in the Online Appendix,
the patterns corroborate the assumption that our measure is a reasonable proxy for taste
for discrimination by exhibiting high correlations between taste for discrimination and
the normalized hate-crimes of 0.89 and 0.85.
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Figure 3. : Racially-motivated hate crimes (solid black line) versus taste for
discrimination (grey dashed line)
Using a logit regression, we can define the estimated probability as
(16) Prob(seitqs|a, ϕtqs, pitqs, Xi) = e
g(a,ϕtqs,pitqs,Xi)
eg(a,ϕtqs,pitqs,Xi) + 1
,
where g(a, ϕtqs, pitqs, Xi) = β0 + β1a + β2ϕtqs + β3pitqs + γXi + εitqs and εitqs,
the error term, is a binomially distributed random variable.
The proportion of principals with a taste for discrimination pitqs and the
proportion with beliefs about discrimination ϕtqs take the value zero for
white individuals, i.e. for s = A. We restrict our sample to white and black
respondents who are not students or retired, while assuming no differences
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in preferences to become self-employed.26 In the logit regression, estimating
self-employment we control for gender, age, age squared, and whether the
father was self-employed. All specifications include time and region fixed
effects.
C. Results
The reports of the baseline regression are reported in Table 1. Years of
schooling, our proxy for ability, and all controls have the expected sign and
are significant at the 1% level in all specifications. The probability of be-
ing self-employed is increasing in years of schooling, hump shaped in age,
females are less likely to be self-employed, and having a father that was
self-employed increases the probability of self-employment.
In columns (1) and (2), we show that either proxy for taste for discrim-
ination against blacks is a significant negative correlate of self-employment
only as long as the proxy for belief about discrimination does not enter the
model. Once belief about discrimination enters the model, either proxy for
taste for discrimination becomes insignificant as can be seen in columns (3)
and (4). The variable representing belief about discrimination is significant
at the 1% level when paired with taste for discrimination. In columns (5)
and (6), we add a race dummy for blacks to validate that unobservables
correlated with being black are not what are actually driving our results.
The race dummy turns out to be insignificant, whereas belief about discrim-
ination remains a significant negative correlate.
In column (7) we pair belief about discrimination with the black race
26In the International Social Survey on Work Orientation III, we find that 71% of
blacks versus 58% of whites in the labour force in the US would choose self-employment
if they could choose between different kinds of jobs, suggesting that our estimates might
even be underestimating effects of discrimination.
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Table 1—: Baseline logistic regression
Dependent variable: Self-employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Belief about discrimination -2.781*** -3.947*** -3.308** -2.947* -1.638*
(0.682) (1.025) (1.296) (1.594) (0.966)
Taste for discrimination 1 -4.240*** 0.084 -0.156
(0.851) (1.221) (1.331)
Taste for discrimination 2 -2.161*** 0.780 0.837
(0.436) (0.806) (0.797)
Black 0.164 -0.229 -0.330
(0.340) (0.283) (0.230)
Years of schooling 0.049*** 0.037*** 0.048*** 0.036*** 0.048*** 0.036*** 0.036***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007)
Female -0.696*** -0.694*** -0.694*** -0.692*** -0.695*** -0.692*** -0.727***
(0.051) (0.052) (0.051) (0.052) (0.051) (0.052) (0.041)
Age 0.097*** 0.095*** 0.098*** 0.095*** 0.099*** 0.095*** 0.097***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009)
Age squared x 1,000 -0.754*** -0.693*** -0.766*** -0.699*** -0.766*** -0.698*** -0.744***
(0.106) (0.109) (0.106) (0.109) (0.106) (0.109) (0.087)
Father was self-employed 0.630*** 0.618*** 0.626*** 0.613*** 0.627*** 0.612*** 0.627***
(0.052) (0.055) (0.052) (0.055) (0.052) (0.055) (0.043)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.063 0.063 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065
Observations 16104 14719 16104 14719 16104 14719 23895
Note: All regressions include a constant. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*, ** and *** significant at 10, 5 and 1 % significance level, respectively.
Source: General Social Survey.
dummy. Again observe that belief about discrimination is a negative and sig-
nificant correlate of self-employment, while the race dummy is negative but
insignificant. If we were to interpret the correlation as causal, the expected
effect on an average black male of eliminating belief about discrimination
from the sample average of 23% to 0% would raise the self-employment prob-
ability from 7.7% to 10.9%, which is an increase of 42%. The magnitude of
the effect of belief about discrimination becomes clear when we calculate the
probability of the average black male being self-employed whilst removing
the effect of unobservables correlated with race, but holding constant belief
about discrimination at the average level of 23%. Here the increase in the
probability of self-employment is lower in magnitude, increasing from 7.7%
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to 10.4%. Eliminating both, belief about discrimination and unobservables
correlated with race, predicts a self-employment probability of 14.5% for
the average black male, which is still lower than then the 15.9% probability
of the average white male. This gap can, amongst others, be attributed
to lower levels of education and demographic factors. While a fully causal
interpretation is farfetched, the results indicate that well established beliefs
about discrimination might be sufficient to lower the probability of self-
employment for blacks.27
D. Additional stylized evidence and applications of the theoretical
framework
In this subsection, we present further evidence in the form of recent find-
ings in the empirical and behavioral literature that our theoretical frame-
work can reconcile. We then go on to highlight how the presented framework
can be also useful in analyzing issues such as the phenomenon of racial tip-
ping points in American neighborhoods.
Alesina, Lotti and Mistrulli (2013) find that banks in Italy charge self-
employed women more than self-employed men for credit. They find that
characteristics such as riskiness, type of business, or differential bank choice
cannot explain their result. They also find that the effect is not restricted
to any particular geographical region and taste based indicators of discrim-
ination cannot explain the observed pattern. As women businesses need
to establish interlinkages, beliefs of banks that potential productive male
27Neither including a measure for statistical discrimination nor excluding farmers from
self-employment changes the results qualitatively. The results can be found in the Online
Appendix.
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links might discriminate against women, might result in banks discriminat-
ing against women too. Consistent with our theoretical model the authors
find that that banks discriminate more against women in sectors, where men
dominate, and can be interpreted as being more likely to be matched with
a discriminatory male link.
The mechanism put forth is also a plausible explanation for features high-
lighted in data for the market for self-employment in India and Sweden.
For instance, why the Schedule Castes (SCs) and Schedule tribes (STs), the
socially most disadvantaged groups in India are relatively more underrep-
resented in urban rather than rural areas in terms of non-farm enterprise
ownership, even though discrimination is higher in rural areas (Iyer, Khanna
and Varshney 2013). Why in Sweden, one of the countries where women’s
labor force participation rate is very high and only 0.4% of the male popula-
tion strongly agree that men make better business executives than women,
has among the lowest level of self-employment for women in the EU.28 The
fact that beliefs about discrimination are higher in urban rather than rural
areas in India, and remain high in Sweden concerning women, could be an
important explanatory factor.29
Daskalova (2013) documents in a lab experiment that people who do
not discriminate when making decisions individually, discriminate while
making joint decisions due to beliefs about what their co-decision maker
28The wave of 2005-2007 of the World Values Survey exhibits that 43% of the Swedish
population mention “Discrimination against women and girls” as one of the two most
pressing problems facing the country. Moreover, Swedish males have the lowest bias
against women across all 39 countries in the sample, while beliefs about discrimination
are the second highest.
29Observe that coordination failures in urban markets are more likely as they are
anonymous, so even if taste for discrimination is higher in the rural than urban settings,
it could well be the case that the coordination failures in urban areas outweighs the taste
for discrimination effect in rural areas, leading to the outcome observed in the data.
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will do. Albrecht et al. (2013) find that in the lab individuals are conser-
vative in updating their beliefs, which points to another channel through
which beliefs regarding discrimination might become sticky over time and
be an important determinant of outcomes for the discriminated group.
Our model is also applicable to a range of markets with strategic com-
plementarities. The dominance of particular ethnic groups in certain pro-
fessions (Greif 1989, 1993; Banerjee and Munshi 2004) might be explained
through our mechanism as ethnic enclaves might help secure complementary
support from other individuals and overcome coordination failures.30
Card, Mas and Rothstein (2008) assume that when black people move
into a neighborhood, white neighbors with a distaste for blacks will change
neighborhoods. Anticipating a decrease in housing prices, people without a
distaste for black neighbors will also sell their property and move. We show
that the presence of neighbors with a distaste for black neighbors is not
required to trigger the segregating dynamics, the belief is sufficient, hence
providing an alternative explanation for the phenomenon of racial tipping
points in the United States.
III. Conclusion
In this paper we show that even once taste for discrimination and statisti-
cal discrimination were to cede to exist in society, discrimination can persist
due to remaining beliefs making discrimination the best-response, a much
weaker condition than traditionally assumed in the literature.
30This benefit, however, has to be weighed against the restriction on occupational
choice that might arise due to ethnic enclaves being effective gate keepers to certain
professions.
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The theoretical mechanism put forth is relevant for markets characterized
by the need to establish productive relations or interlinkages with other
agents in society in order for the production process to be carried out. It is
shown that in such markets the presence of beliefs regarding the existence of
taste discriminators, even when no agents with taste for discrimination exist
in society, can result in agents exhibiting discriminatory behavior in equi-
librium. Discrimination arises as a rational response to the belief that other
agents might discriminate, which would impose losses due to the comple-
mentarity in the production process. The model shows lower participation
and payoff to the discriminated group in markets characterized by the pres-
ence of interlinkages.
Suggestive empirical evidence in support of the theoretical framework is
provided by analyzing the market for self-employment, a market character-
ized by the need to establish productive relations to be able to operate and be
successful. The outcomes predicted by the model, in terms of participation
rates and incomes for the self-employed for the discriminated group being
lower, are confirmed using data from the General Social Survey 1972-2012 of
the US and creating proxies for taste and beliefs regarding discrimination.
We validate that the downward timetrend of our proxies of taste for discrim-
ination do not necessarily reflect a social desirability bias, as the proxies are
strongly correlated with racially-motivated hate crimes against blacks. A
simple logit model shows that beliefs about discrimination are a significant
negative correlate of self-employment for blacks, even after controlling for
individual level characteristics, as well as region and year fixed effects.
The nature of discriminatory coordination failures does not allow mar-
ket forces to overcome discrimination and may require alternative policy
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tools. The various mechanisms through which discrimination manifests its
dynamic linkages in terms of cross market and intergenerational effects,
and the tendency to persist through cumulative and belief based channels,
need to be understood and explored in order to develop policies aimed at
eradicating discrimination and achieving equal treatment and opportuni-
ties.
Appendix
A1. Proofs
PROOF:
Proposition 1
1) First observe that only B-type individuals in the ability range a∗ ≤
a < a∗b offer 1 + r ≤ σN(a) < 1 + r + b, and hence can potentially
face discrimination. The fact that there exists no B-type in the range
a∗ ≤ a < a∗b that prefers to offer the Nash bargaining solution while
attempting to enter activities characterized by interlinkages implies:
(A1) (1− ϕT ∗)2(λa− 2σN(a)) + (1− (1− ϕhT ∗)2)(a− δ)− a < 0,
where the left hand side (LHS) is the expected net payoff from of-
fering the Nash bargaining solution minus the payoff from entering
the activity involving no interlinkages. The LHS is strictly increas-
ing in a, which implies that if it is not satisfied for a∗b then it is not
satisfied for all a ≤ a∗b . This implies that all B-types with a such
that λa − 2(1 + r + b) ≥ a (or all ab ≤ a ≤ a∗b) offer a share equal
to (1 + r + b), while being accepted by the principals and success-
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fully enter activities characterized by interlinkages. All B-types with
a∗ ≤ a < ab will be unable to offer a share to compensate the taste of
discriminators, and hence enter activities involving no interlinkages.
Moreover, note as now all individuals of the B-type with a ≥ a∗b offer
σN(a) ≥ (1 + r+ b), and all B-types with ab ≤ a ≤ a∗b offer (1 + r+ b),
this implies that from period T ∗ onwards there will be no offers by a
B-type made within the range of (1+r) to (1+r+b). Therefore, beliefs
will remain frozen at the current level implying the above equilibrium
will persist for ever.
2) Let us denote by alb as the lowest B-type in the range a
∗ ≤ a < a∗b
at T ∗ who prefers offering the Nash bargaining solution and attempts
to enter the activity involving interlinkages. As the Nash bargaining
solution is strictly increasing in a, it implies that all individuals with
a ≥ alb offer the Nash bargaining solution in period T ∗. This means
that all B-types in the ability range alb ≤ a ≤ a∗b offer the Nash
bargaining solution and are accepted as no more principals with taste
for discrimination exist. Assume the total number of cases subject to
potential discrimination are npot and as no taste discriminators exist,
the actual cases of discrimination are zero. This implies that the point
estimates in the next period T ∗+1 for meeting a discriminator is given
by ϕT ∗+1 =
αl0+
∑T∗
t=1 kt
αl0+β
l
0+
∑T∗
t=1 ntb+npot
. Therefore, ϕT ∗+1 < ϕT ∗ , implying the
lowest type who applies in T ∗ + 2 is such that a < alb, or generalizing
ϕT ∗+t < ϕT ∗ for all t > 0, or
dϕt
dt
< 0 for all t > T ∗. Hence, at
some point ϕT → 0, implying all B-types with a ≥ a∗ apply and enter
activities characterized by interlinkages, wherefore discrimination does
not persist in society. The number of periods for which discrimination
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will persist is as a function of ϕT ∗ = f(pi0, ω) and the B-type with the
lowest a preferring the Nash solution to wage employment in T ∗.
PROOF:
Proposition 2
Assume the set B is large enough that individuals’ abilities can be approx-
imated by a continuous distribution on the interval [0, 1]. Proposition 1.1
shows that all individuals of the B-type with a∗ ≤ a < ab enter activities not
involving interlinkages, whereas A-types of the same ability enter activities
involving interlinkages. Moreover, B-type individuals with ab ≤ a < a∗b offer
1 + r + b > σN(a).
Now we can write the transfer, which principals receive from individ-
uals wanting to escape the discrimination as an integral over the ability
range who pay the higher fee:
∫ a∗b
ab
2(1 + r + b − σN(a))da = ∫ a∗b
ab
2(1 + r +
b − (λ−1)a+r+δ+1
3
)da. Therefore, the gain to principals would be 1
3
((a∗b −
ab)(4 + 4r + 6b − 2δ) − (λ − 1)((a∗b)2 − a2b))). Now the loss to principals,
due to able individuals entering activities not involving interlinkages, can
be written as:
∫ ab
a∗ 2[σ
N(a)− (1 + r)]da = ∫ ab
a∗ 2[
(λ−1)a+r+δ+1
3
− (1 + r)]da ⇒
Loss = 1
3
((a2b − (a∗)2)(λ− 1) + (ab − a∗)(2δ − 4r− 4)). In order for the loss
to be at least as big as the gain we require: ((a∗b − ab)(4 + 4r + 6b − 2δ) −
(λ − 1)((a∗b)2 − a2b) ≤ ((a2b − (a∗)2)(λ − 1) + (ab − a∗)(2δ − 4r − 4)). Rear-
ranging we get (4 + 4r− 2δ)(a∗h− a∗) + 6b(a∗b − ab) ≤ ((a∗b)2− (a∗)2)(λ− 1).
Now substituting a∗ = 2(1+r+δ)
λ−1 , a
∗
b =
2(1+r)+3b−δ
λ−1 , and ab =
2(1+r+b)
λ−1 we find
that for this to hold the condition is b ≥ δ . But since no discrimination
exists when δ > b (because in that case the offer σN(a) > 1 + r + b for all
a ≥ a∗) gains can never be greater than losses if we are in an equilibrium as
in proposition 1.1.
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A2. Figures
10 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
1.6
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
Ability a
N
e
t 
w
a
g
e
No 
inte
rlink
age
s
Loss
T
ra
n
sf
er
Interlinkages
(a) In the example individuals of A-type become self-
employed (black dashed line) when ability a ≥ 0.6. B-
type individuals only with a ≥ 0.8 become self-employed
(black dotted line) and those with 0.8 ≥ a ≥ 0.9 pay
higher rates resulting in lower net earnings.
20
00
0
40
00
0
60
00
0
80
00
0
10
00
00
Co
ns
ta
nt
 U
S$
less than HS HS Junior College Bachelor Graduate
Highest degree earned
Black White
Datasource: General Social Survey 1972−2012
Mean yearly income of self−employed males by race
(b) Mean yearly income of black and white self-
employed by educational degree
Figure A1. : Income from interlinkages by type in model and data
44
*
REFERENCES
Aigner, Dennis J, and Glen G Cain. 1977. “Statistical theories of
discrimination in labor markets.” Industrial and Labor relations review,
30(2): 175–187.
Akerlof, George. 1976. “The economics of caste and of the rat race and
other woeful tales.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90(4): 599–617.
Akerlof, George. 1985. “Discriminatory, status-based wages among
tradition-oriented, stochastically trading coconut producers.” Journal of
Political Economy, 93(2): 265–276.
Albrecht, Konstanze, Emma Von Essen, Juliane Parys, and Nora
Szech. 2013. “Updating, self-confidence, and discrimination.” European
Economic Review, 60: 144–169.
Alesina, Alberto, Francesca Lotti, and Paolo Emilio Mistrulli. 2013.
“Do women pay more for credit? Evidence from Italy.” Journal of the
European Economic Association, 11(s1): 45–66.
Alesina, Alberto, Paola Giuliano, and Nathan Nunn. 2013. “On the
Origins of Gender Roles: Women and the Plough.” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 128(2): 469–530.
Argenziano, Rossella, and Itzhak Gilboa. 2012. “History as a coordi-
nation device.” Theory and Decision, 73(4): 501–512.
Arrow, Kenneth J. 1973. “Discrimination in Labor Markets.” , ed. O.
Ashenfelter and A. Rees, Chapter The Theory of Discrimination, 3–33.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Bailey, Thomas, and Roger Waldinger. 1991. “Primary, secondary, and
enclave labor markets: A training systems approach.” American Socio-
DISCRIMINATION WITHOUT TASTE 45
logical Review, 56(4): 432–445.
Banerjee, Abhijit, and Kaivan Munshi. 2004. “How efficiently is capital
allocated? Evidence from the knitted garment industry in Tirupur.” The
Review of Economic Studies, 71(1): 19–42.
Basu, Kaushik. 2010. Beyond the invisible hand: Groundwork for a new
economics. Princeton University Press.
Becker, Gary S. 1957. The economics of discrimination. University of
Chicago Press.
Bennett, Elaine. 1997. “Multilateral bargaining problems.” Games and
Economic Behavior, 19(2): 151–179.
Bisin, Alberto, and Thierry Verdier. 2001. “The economics of cultural
transmission and the dynamics of preferences.” Journal of Economic The-
ory, 97(2): 298–319.
Blanchflower, David G. 2009. “Minority self-employment in the United
States and the impact of affirmative action programs.” Annals of Finance,
5(3-4): 361–396.
Blanchflower, David G, Phillip B Levine, and David J Zimmer-
man. 2003. “Discrimination in the small-business credit market.” Review
of Economics and Statistics, 85(4): 930–943.
Borjas, George J. 1986. “The self-employment experience of immigrants.”
Working Paper 1942, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Burguet, Roberto, and Ramon Caminal. 2011. “Simultaneous Nash
bargaining with consistent beliefs.” Barcelona GSE Working Paper Series
Working Paper no 521.
Card, David, Alexandre Mas, and Jesse Rothstein. 2008. “Tip-
ping and the Dynamics of Segregation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
46
123(1): 177–218.
Coate, Stephen, and Glenn C Loury. 1993. “Will affirmative-action
policies eliminate negative stereotypes?” American Economic Review,
83(5): 1220–1240.
Daskalova, Vessela. 2013. “Discrimination, Social Identity, and Coordi-
nation: An Experiment.” mimeo.
Dess´ı, Roberta. 2008. “Collective memory, cultural transmission, and in-
vestments.” American Economic Review, 98(1): 534–560.
Fairlie, Robert W. 1999. “The absence of the African-American owned
business: An analysis of the dynamics of self-employment.” Journal of
Labor Economics, 17(1): 80–108.
Fairlie, Robert W. 2002. “Drug Dealing and Legitimate Self-
Employment.” Journal of Labor Economics, 20(3): 538–537.
Fairlie, Robert W, and Alicia M Robb. 2008. “Race and en-
trepreneurial success: Black-, Asian-, and White-owned businesses in the
United States.” MIT Press Books, 1.
Fairlie, Robert W, and Bruce D Meyer. 1996. “Ethnic and racial self-
employment differences and possible explanations.” Journal of Human
Resources, 31(4): 757–793.
Fairlie, Robert W, and Bruce D Meyer. 2000. “Trends in self-
employment among white and black men during the twentieth century.”
Journal of Human Resources, 35(4): 643–669.
Fryer, Roland, and Matthew O Jackson. 2008. “A categorical model
of cognition and biased decision making.” The BE Journal of Theoretical
Economics, 8(1): 1935–1704.
Gilboa, Itzhak, and David Schmeidler. 1995. “Case-based decision the-
DISCRIMINATION WITHOUT TASTE 47
ory.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(3): 605–639.
Greif, Avner. 1989. “Reputation and coalitions in medieval trade: ev-
idence on the Maghribi traders.” The Journal of Economic History,
49(4): 857–882.
Greif, Avner. 1993. “Contract enforceability and economic institutions in
early trade: The Maghribi traders’ coalition.” American Economic Re-
view, 83(3): 525–548.
Griffin, Larry J, and Kenneth A Bollen. 2009. “What do these mem-
ories do? Civil rights remembrance and racial attitudes.” American Soci-
ological Review, 74(4): 594–614.
Halbwachs, Maurice. 1992. On collective memory. University of Chicago
Press.
Iyer, Lakshmi, Tarun Khanna, and Ashutosh Varshney. 2013.
“Caste and Entrepreneurship in India.” Economic and Political Weekly,
48(6): 52–60.
Kaushal, Neeraj, Robert Kaestner, and Cordelia Reimers. 2007.
“Labor market effects of September 11th on Arab and Muslim residents
of the United States.” Journal of Human Resources, 42(2): 275–308.
King, Miriam, Steven Ruggles, Trent Alexander, Sarah Flood,
Katie Genadek, Matthew B Schroeder, Brandon Trampe, and
Rebecca Vick. 2010. Integrated public use microdata series, current pop-
ulation survey. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.
Lucas Jr, Robert E. 1978. “On the size distribution of business firms.”
The Bell Journal of Economics, 9(2): 508–523.
Lundberg, Shelly, and Richard Startz. 1983. “Private discrimination
and social intervention in competitive labor market.” American Economic
48
Review, 73(3): 340–347.
Lundberg, Shelly, and Richard Startz. 1998. “On the persistence of
racial inequality.” Journal of Labor Economics, 16(2): 292–323.
Mailath, George J, Larry Samuelson, and Avner Shaked. 2000. “En-
dogenous inequality in integrated labor markets with two-sided search.”
American Economic Review, 90(1): 46–72.
Moore, Robert L. 1983. “Employer discrimination: Evidence from self-
employed workers.” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 65(3): 496–
501.
Neal, Derek A, and William R Johnson. 1996. “The role of pre-market
factors in black-white wage differences.” Journal of Political Economy,
104(5): 869–95.
Nunn, Nathan, and Leonard Wantchekon. 2011. “The slave trade
and the origins of mistrust in Africa.” American Economic Review,
101(7): 3221–3252.
Peski, Marcin, and Bala´zs Szentes. 2013. “Spontaneous discrimina-
tion.” American Economic Review, 103(6): 2412–2436.
Phelps, Edmund S. 1972. “The statistical theory of racism and sexism.”
American Economic Review, 62(4): 659–661.
Rose´n, A˚sa. 1997. “An equilibrium search-matching model of discrimina-
tion.” European Economic Review, 41(8): 1589–1613.
Smith, Tom W, Peter Marsden, Michael Hout, and Jibum Kim.
2012. General Social Surveys. National Opinion Research Center.
Voigtla¨nder, Nico, and Hans-Joachim Voth. 2012. “Persecution per-
petuated: the medieval origins of anti-Semitic violence in Nazi Germany.”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(3): 1339–92.
